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ABSTRACT
The burgeoning success of deep learning has raised the security
and privacy concerns as more and more tasks are accompanied
with sensitive data. Adversarial attacks in deep learning have emerged
as one of the dominating security threat to a range of mission-
critical deep learning systems and applications. This paper takes
a holistic and principled approach to perform statistical charac-
terization of adversarial examples in deep learning. We provide a
general formulation of adversarial examples and elaborate on the
basic principle for adversarial attack algorithm design. We intro-
duce easy and hard categorization of adversarial attacks to analyze
the effectiveness of adversarial examples in terms of attack suc-
cess rate, degree of change in adversarial perturbation, average en-
tropy of prediction qualities, and fraction of adversarial examples
that lead to successful attacks. We conduct extensive experimental
study on adversarial behavior in easy and hard attacks under deep
learning modelswith different hyperparameters and different deep
learning frameworks. We show that the same adversarial attack be-
haves differently under different hyperparameters and across dif-
ferent frameworks due to the different features learned under dif-
ferent deep learning model training process. Our statistical char-
acterization with strong empirical evidence provides a transforma-
tive enlightenment onmitigation strategies towards effective coun-
termeasures against present and future adversarial attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has achieved impressive success on a wide range of
domains like computer vision [18] and natural language process-
ing [7], outperforming other machine learning approaches. Many
of deep learning tasks, such as face recognition [42], self-driving
cars [16], speech recognition [14] and malware detection [8], are
security-critical [2, 34].
Recent studies have shown that deep learning models are vul-
nerable to adversarial input at prediction phase [41]. Adversarial
examples are the input artifacts that are created from natural data
by adding adversarial distortions. The purpose of adding such ad-
versarial noise is to covertly fool deep learning model to misclas-
sify the input. For instance, attackers could use adversarial exam-
ples to confuse a face recognition authentication camera or a voice
recognition system to breach a financial or government entity with
misplaced authorization [40]. Similarly, a self-driving vehicle could
take unexpected action if the vision camera recognizes a stop sign,
crafted by adversarial perturbation, as a speed limit sign, or if the
voice instruction receiver misinterprets a compromised stop in-
struction as a drive-through instruction [4].
The threat of adversarial examples has inspired a sizable body
of research on various attack algorithms [1, 4, 6, 9–11, 19, 20, 26,
29, 30, 33, 40, 41, 44]. Even with the black box access to the pre-
diction API of a deep learning as a service, such as those provided
by Amazon, Google or IBM, one could launch adversarial attacks
to the privately trained deep neural network (DNN) model. Due
to transferability [23, 31, 32, 43], adversarial examples generated
from one deep learning model can be transferred to fool other deep
learning models. Given that deep learning is complex, there are
many hidden spots that are not yet understood, such blind spots
can be utilized as attack surfaces for generating adversarial exam-
ples. Furthermore, adversarial attacks can happen in both train-
ing and prediction phases. Typical training phase attacks inject ad-
versarial training data into the original training data to mis-train
the network model [15]. Most of existing adversarial attacks are
schemed at prediction phase, which is our focus in this paper.
To develop effective mitigation strategies against adversarial at-
tacks, we articulate that the important first step is to gain in-depth
understanding of the adverse effect and divergence of adversarial
examples on the deep learning systems. In this paper, we take a
holistic and principled approach to characterize adversarial attacks
as an adversarial learning of the input data and a constrained opti-
mization problem. We dive into the general formulations of adver-
sarial examples and establish basic principles for adversarial noise
injection. We characterize adversarial examples into easy and hard
attacks based on statistical measures such as success rate, degree of
change and prediction entropy, and analyze different behavior of
easy and hard cases under different hyperparameters, i.e., training
epochs, sizes of feature maps and DNN frameworks. Moreover, we
visualize the construction of adversarial examples and character-
ize their spatial and statistical features. We present empirical evi-
dence on the effectiveness of adversarial attacks through extensive
experiments. Our principled and statistical characterization of ad-
versarial noise injection, the effectiveness of adversarial examples
with easy and hard attack cases, and the impact of DNN on adver-
sarial examples can be considered as enlightenment on the design
of mitigation strategies and defense mechanisms against present
and future adversarial attacks.
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2 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES AND ATTACKS
We first review the basic concept of DNN model and the threat
model. Thenwe provide a general formulation of adversarial exam-
ples and attacks, describe the metrics for quantifying adversarial
objectives and basic principle of adversarial perturbation.
2.1 DNN Model
Let x ∈ X be an input example in the training dataset X . A DNN
model F (x) is made ofn successive layers of neurons from the input
data to the output prediction, and F (x) = fn(Ωn , fn−1(Ωn−1, ... f2(Ω2,
f1(Ω1,x)))). Each layer represents a parametric function fi , i ∈
1 . . .n,which computes an activation function, e.g., ReLU, ofweighted
representation of the input from previous layer to generate a new
representation. The parameter set Ωi , i ∈ 1 . . .n, consists of sev-
eral weight vectors
−→
Wi = [
−→
W ki ]ki ∈1..Ki and bias vectors
−→
Bi =
[
−→
B ki ]ki ∈1..Ki , where Ki denotes the number of neurons in layer i .
Let Y = {y1, , ...,ym} be the class label space, where m is the to-
tal number of labels, and −→y = F (x) be the classification prediction
result for input x , in the form of m-dimension probability vector
−→y = {po , ...,pj ...,pm}, such that pj indicates the probability gen-
erated by DNN model toward class y j , 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1 and
∑m
j=0 pj = 1.
The predicted label Cx ∈ Y is the class with largest probability in
the prediction vector. For ease of presentation, we assume that if
there are multiple class labels with the same maximal probability,
i.e., {ys |s ∈ 1, . . . ,m,∀j , s ∈ {1, . . . ,m}s .t .ps ≥ pj }, only one
predicted class label is chosen for a given example x , denoted by
Cx . The common output layer is a softmax layer, the prediction
vector is also called logits, and we call the input of the softmax
layer the prelogits.
The deployment of a DNN model consists of two phases: model
training phase andmodel-based prediction phase. In training phase,
a set of known input-label pairs (x,yL) is used to train a DNN
model. yL is the known (ground truth) class label of the input x .
TheDNNfirst uses existing parametersΩ to generate classification
from input data forwardly, then computes a loss function J (−→y ,yL)
that measures the distance between the prediction vector and the
ground truth label.With a goal ofminimizing the loss function, the
DNN training algorithm updates the parameters Ω at each layer
using backpropagation with an optimizer, e.g., stochastic gradient
descent (SGD), in an iterative fashion. The trained DNN will be
refined through testing. Two metrics are used to measure the dif-
ference between the predicted vector and the ground truth label of
the test input. One is accuracy that shows the percentage of test
input whose predicted class Cx ∈ Y is identical with its ground
truth labelyL . The other is the loss function that computes the dis-
tance of the predicted class vector −→y to the label yL . The trained
DNN model produced at the end of the training phase will be used
for classification prediction. At the prediction phase, the predic-
tion API sends an input x to the trained DNN model to compute
its prediction vector −→y and the corresponding predicted label Cx
via the set of fixed parameters learned in the training phase.
2.2 Threat Model
Insider Threat: An insider threat refers to white-box attack and
compromises from inside the organization that provides the DNN
model based prediction service, such as poisoning attacks during
training phase. Insider adversaries may know the DNN architec-
ture, the intermediate results during the DNN computation, and
are able to fully or partially manipulate the DNN model training
process, e.g., injecting adversarial samples into the training dataset,
manipulating the training outcome by controlling the inputs and
outputs in some layers of DNN.
Outsider Threat: An outsider threat refers to black-box attack
and compromises from external to a DNN model. Such attackers
can only access the prediction API of the DNN as a service but
do not have access to the DNN training and the trained DNN pre-
diction model. However, attackers may have general and common
background knowledge of DNN that is publicly available. We con-
sider two types of outsider attacks: untargeted or targeted.
Untargeted Attack is a source class misclassification attack,
which aims to misclassify the benign input by adding adversar-
ial perturbation so that the predicted class of the benign input is
changed to some other classes in Y without a specific target class.
TargetedAttack is a source-targetmisclassification, which aims
to misclassify the predicted class of a benign example input x to a
targeted class in Y by purposely crafting the benign input example
x via adversarial perturbation. As a result, the predicted class of
the input x is covertly changed from the original class (source) to
the specific target class intended by the attacker.
Let xadv be the maliciously crafted sample of benign input x .
Figure 1 illustrates the workflow of an adversarial example based
outsider attack to the prediction API of a deep learning service
provider, consisting of 7 steps. (1) A benign input x is sent to the
predictionAPI, which (2) invokes the trainedmodel to compute the
prediction result. (3) Upon the API returning the prediction proba-
bility vector−→y and its predicted class labelCx , (4) the attacker may
intercept the result and (5) launch an adversarial example based
attack by generating adversarial example xadv (in one step or it-
eratively). (6) The adversary collects the prediction vector −→y adv
and the predicted class Cxadv . The iteration stops if the attack is
successful. (7) The user receives the incorrect result.
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Figure 1: Outsider Adversarial Attack Workflow
2.3 Formulation of Adversarial Examples
For adversaries, an ideal adversarial attack is to construct a per-
turbed input xadv with minimal distance to x to fool the DNN
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model such that the resulting prediction vector is −→y adv with the
predicted label Cxadv , which is different from Cx , and yet its hu-
man user would still visually consider the adversarial input xadv
similar to or the same as the benign input x and thus believe that
the predicted labelCadv should be identical toCx . Let ∆x = dist(x,xadv )
measure the distance between the original input x and the adver-
sarial input xadv . Example distance metrics can be L0, L2, and L∞
norm. For image input, L0 norm describes the number of pixels
of x that are changed; L2 norm is the Euclidean distance between
input x and xadv ; and L∞ norm denotes the maximum change to
any pixel of input x . ∆x can be seen as the perturbation noise in-
jected into the benign input to construct an adversarial input by
the adversarial attack algorithm. We below provide a general for-
mulation of an adversarial example based attack:
∆x = dist(x,xadv ) (1)
s .t . min β∆x + att(xadv ) (1 − β)д(
−→y adv ,y
∗) (2)
x ∈ X , xadv < X
Cxadv , Cx , Cx ∈ Y , Cxadv ∈ Y/Cx
HCxadv = HCx
whereatt(xadv ) is a flag of untargeted and targeted attack:att(xadv )=-
1 when the attack is untargeted and att(xadv )=1 when the attack
is targeted.д(−→y adv ,y
∗) is some objective function the attack seeks
to optimize. Parameter 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 controls the relative importance
of the perturbation and the objective function. HCxadv = HCx
means that human perceptional class of adversarial input needs to
be the same as that of the original benign input.
For untageted attack, the label y∗ denotes the predicted class
Cx of the benign input x such that д(
−→y adv ,Cx ) measures the dis-
tance between the prediction vector of adversarial input xadv and
Cx . This distance is to be maximized to make the adversarial in-
put successfully misclassified, thus achieving the goal of predict-
ing the label Cxadv of adversarial input as any label but not the
label of original benign input x . Accordingly, the perturbation ∆x
only concerns the prediction vector of adversarial example and the
predicted class of benign example, defined as δx (
−−−→yadv ,Cx ).
For targeted attack, the label y∗ denotes the target label yT so
that д(−→y adv ,y
T ) is some objective function that measures the dis-
tance between the prediction vector of adversarial input xadv and
the attack target label yT . The attack is to minimize this distance
so that the adversarial input xadv , generated by maliciously in-
jecting perturbation to x , is classified as the target label with high
confidence. In contrast to untargeted attack, which only needs to
lower the probability confidence on the original labelCx , the target
attack needs to enhance the probability confidence on the target la-
bel while mitigating the probability confidence for all other labels
so that the target label could stand out. This makes targeted attack
much harder than untargeted ones. Thus, the adversarial noise ∆x
is generated from perturbation function δx (
−→y ,Cx ,y
T ).
Examples of objective function in Equation 2 include (1) L2 loss,
(2) cross-entropy loss, loss like (3) and their variants.
loss(1) =
∑
j
| |pj − q j | |2, pj ∈
−→y adv , q j ∈
−→y ∗
loss(2) = −
∑
j
q j logpj , pj ∈
−→y adv , q j ∈
−→y ∗
loss(3) =max(0,maxpj − q
∗), pj ∈
−→y adv , q
∗
= Cx ory
T
where −→y j is a one-hot prediction vector whose prediction class has
the probability of 1 and the rest is 0, i.e., pj = 1, ∀k , j, pk = 0.
Equation2 aims to optimize the objective function and the amount
of perturbation at the same time while the parameter β controls
the relative importance of these two items. When β = 1, the prob-
lem is centered on minimizing the amount of perturbation while
maintaining human imperceptibility. Jacobian-based attack [33] is
an example. When β = 0, Equation 2 aims at optimizing the objec-
tive function without any regulation on the amount of perturba-
tion. It may suffer from over-crafting and lead to violation of hu-
man imperceptibility [40]. When 0 < β < 1, Equation 2 minimizes
the amount of perturbation and the objective function together to
avoid either of them dominating the optimization problem. Since
large noise would increase the probability of attack being detected
by human, the first term of Equation 2 acts as regularization of
the second. In fact, the objective function could have an additional
regularizer. Example attacks when 0 < β < 1 are the Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] and those optimization-based at-
tacks [6, 10, 41].
2.4 Adverse Effect of Adversarial Examples
We propose to use the following three evaluation metrics to ana-
lyze and compare the adverse effect of adversarial examples: Suc-
cess Rate(SR), Degree of Change (DoC), and information entropy.
SR measures the percentage of adversarial examples that result
in successful attacks in all adversarial input data generated by us-
ing the adversarial example generator.
SR =
successful adversarial examples
all adversarial examples
An adversarial example xadv is considered successful when un-
der limited amount of perturbation noise, the following conditions
hold: (1) Cadv , Cx ; and (2) let
−→y adv = {p1, . . . ,pm}, for untar-
geted attack, ∃k ∈ 1, . . . ,m, we have pk ≥ pCx ; and for targeted
attack, pyT is the maximum probability in the prediction vector
−→y adv such that ∀j ∈ 1, . . . ,m, j , y
T , pyT ≥ pj and pyT > pCx .
By using SR, we are able to statistically measure how hard it is to
move the original class of an input into another class. The higher
the SR is, the more adverse effect the adversarial attack can cause.
However, the SR alone is not sufficient to characterize the adverse
effect of adversarial example. This motivates us to introduce per-
class SR and other metrics. Per-class SR measures the percentage
of adversarial inputs that are successfully misclassified among the
total adversarial examples generated from one class.
DoC describes the distance between adversarial example xadv
and original benign input x , which is the objective that adversarial
attacks aim to minimize in Equation 2. Let ∆x = | |xadv − x | |p be
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the Lp distance of the two inputs, and the DoC is computed as
DoC =
1
N
∑N
1
∆x
| |x | |p )
,xadv ∈ Xadv , |Xadv | = N (3)
where | |x | |p is the p norm of the input data x . p can be 0, 2,∞.
For example, if the perturbation noise changes 30 pixels in a 28*28-
pixel image, the DoC for this perturbed image is 3028∗28 = 0.038 un-
der L0 distance. If the dataset has 100 maliciously crafted images,
i.e., |Xadv | = N = 100, we add each of their DoC values and com-
pute their average. From the perspective of adversaries, there are
several advantages in keeping DoC theoretically the smallest. First,
it means that less effort is required to launch the adversarial at-
tack in a fast and efficient manner. Second, the minimal amount of
change is one way to satisfyHCxadv = HCx , making the attack hu-
man imperceptible and hard to detect. In contrast, randomly added
perturbation can be inefficient for adversaries with high risk of
making more effort adding noise with low SR.
The third metric is information entropy [39], defined as the av-
erage amount of information produced by a stochastic source of
data. We compute the entropy on the distribution of probabilities
in −→y .
Φ = −
∑m
j=1
pj log2pj , pj ∈
−→y (4)
The more even the probability is distributed, the larger the entropy
is. Generally, entropy refers to disorder or uncertainty of a distribu-
tion. Thus the prediction vector of [0.2, 0.8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] has
larger entropy than that of [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], because on the
prediction of the second class, the latter is certain with a probabil-
ity of 1 whereas the former is less certain with a probability of 0.8.
We also use the average information entropy, which is defined as
follows: for N input images, we compute their individual informa-
tion entropy, accumulate the entropy of all N inputs, and divide
the entropy sum by N . The average entropy serves as a good alter-
native indicator to differentiate attacks with high and low SR.
2.5 Basic Principle of Perturbation Injection
The goal of adversarial perturbation is to make DNNmodel to mis-
classify an input by changing the objective function value based on
its gradients on the adversarial direction. Given the trained DNN
has fixed parameters, the update should be on the benign input
x and be minimized so that only small amount of perturbation is
added to the input x to keep the human imperceptibility intact.
Such adversarial perturbation update can be done in either one-
step (t = 1) or multiple steps iteratively (t > 1):
xt
adv
=

x + θR(
∂h(−→y ,y∗)
∂x , t = 1,
xadv
t−1
+ θR(
∂h(−→y
t−1
adv ,y
∗)
∂xadv t−1
), t > 1,
(5)
For untargeted attacks, y∗ = Cx . For targeted attacks, y
∗
= yT . θ
controls how much to update at a time. h( ) is a function that de-
scribes the relation between the prediction vector −→y adv of adver-
sarial input xadv and some attack objective class y
∗. h( ) concerns
the prediction vector or loss function of the original input or the
adversarial input in the previous iteration, which is the attack spot
for adversarial perturbation update. In contrast, д( ) focuses on the
prediction vector of the current adversarial input, which indicates
the adversarial attack objective to be optimized. R( ) is the craft-
ing rule that is based on partial gradient of function h( ), which
implies how the perturbation is added. R( ) also ensures that the
perturbation is clipped. Clip refers to a value constraint so that the
perturbation cannot go beyond the range of the feature value. For
image, if the perturbation increases the value of a pixel beyond 255,
then the pixel value is clipped to 255. The update term θR( ) has the
same size as the input x when t = 1 and as the previous adversarial
input xt−1
adv
when t > 1.
One-step v.s. Multi-step Adversarial Examples. One-step
attack is fast but excessive noise may be added to the benign in-
put unnecessarily, because it is difficult to calibrate exactly how
much noise is needed for successful attack. One-step attack puts
more weight on the objective function and less on minimizing the
amount of perturbation. The partial gradient of h(−→y adv ,y
∗) in
Equation 5 only points out the direction of change and the relative
importance of different places to perturb in the input data. Unlike
one-step attack which has only one update on the original benign
input, the multi-step attack uses a feedback-loop that iteratively
modifies the input with more carefully injected perturbation un-
til the input is successfully misclassified or the maximum pertur-
bation threshold is reached to ensure the human imperceptibility
(HCx = HCadv ). Although iterative attack is computationallymore
expensive, the attack is more strategic with high SR and less pertur-
bation. Themulti-step attack strikes a good balance onminimizing
the amount of perturbation and the objective function.
Loss Function as the objective function. The loss function
J (−→y ,y∗) measures the distance between the prediction vector −→y
and the attack destination class y∗. When
∂ J (−→y ,y∗)
∂x
= 0, it leads
to minimal (local minimal) value of the convex (non-convex) loss
function. When
∂ J (−→y ,y∗)
∂x > 0 , adding values to input x will in-
crease the value of loss function. However, when
∂ J (−→y ,y∗)
∂x < 0,
adding values to input x will decrease the value of loss function.
Thus, manipulating the input x could change the loss function.
Typical attacks that utilize the gradient of loss function include
one step untargeted/targeted FGSM [11], untargeted/targeted Iter-
ative Method [19], and the attack in [40]. To attack an image input
by following [11], we build a noise map based on the gradient of
loss function and a simple pixel-based crafting rule R( ), in which
the pixel value is set to 0 (dark) if the gradient of loss function at
that pixel position is below zero, to 127 if the gradient is zero, and to
255 (light) if the gradient is above zero. We are able to perform un-
targeted attacks by controlling the amount of noise injected using
θ . Figure 2 shows three adversarial examples (on the right) gener-
ated by applying the same perturbation noise (middle) to the same
original input on the left under different θ values. When θ = 0.05,
the attack fails. As we increase θ to 0.1, the attack successfully mis-
classifies the input image of digit 1 to the class of digit 7, and such
misclassification is imperceptible as we visually still see the per-
turbed image on the right as digit 1 image without much change
(HCx = HCadv ). By further increasing θ to 0.2, the attack remains
successful, but it misclassifies the same input image of digit 1 to
the class of digit 8 instead. In Figure 3, we use a different input
image of digit 1, with the same θ = 0.2 and the same algorithm to
add perturbation noise produced in the same way as in Figure 2.
4
However, the attack is unsuccessful and the prediction vector indi-
cates that the predicted class for the maliciously crafted example
is still digit 1. This experiment shows that the success of attack is
influenced both by θ and by the input instance. Furthermore, Fig-
ure 2 shows that both entropy and loss will grow with the larger
gradient-based noise. Larger entropy indicates more even distribu-
tion of the probabilities in the prediction vector. Larger loss indi-
cates that the prediction vector of adversarial input is more erro-
neous when compared with the predicted label of the benign input.
This empirical evidence also indicates that the entropy of the pre-
diction vector and the loss is also a good metric for characterizing
the effectiveness and divergence of attacks.
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Figure 2: An illustration of loss function based attack (θ=0.05, 0.1,
0.2), pixel values are added in light area of the perturbation, are de-
ducted in dark area, and do not change in gray area.
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Figure 3: An unsuccessful loss function based attack (θ=0.2)
Optimization of loss function with regularization is an exten-
sion of the loss function based attacks using adversarial examples.
CW attack [6] and RP2 attack [10] are examples of such attacks.
The benefit of controlling the amount of change with a regularizer
is to avoid drastic change. However, the optimization problem is of-
ten solved via techniques like Adam optimizer, which introduces
considerable computation overhead.
Prediction vector based objective function. Similarly, for
prediction vector, adding noise by increasing values on input x
will make the prediction vector value on class j go up if the par-
tial gradient of prediction vector on class j is greater than zero,
i.e.,
∂y j
∂x > 0. Analogously,
∂y j
∂x < 0 means increasing the value
of input will make the prediction vector value on class j go down.
When
∂y j
∂x = 0, changing the input a little bit will not change the
prediction vector at all. The same attack principle can be applied
to prelogits as well, as prediction vector can be seen as normalized
and difference-amplified prelogits. Example attacks that utilize the
gradient of prediction vector are Jacobian-based attack [33] and
Deepfool [29]. In fact, the gradient of loss function can be seen as
an extension of gradient of prediction vector due to the chain rule
since loss function is computed from prediction vector.
In summary, based on the inherent relation among input data,
the gradient of loss function, and prediction vector, we are able to
establish basic attack principle for untargeted and targeted adver-
sarial attacks. For untargeted attack, the goal is to craft the image
in a way to lower the probability or confidence of the original class
of the input until it is no longer the largest probability in the pre-
diction vector. There are three ways to do so: (1) The adversaries
could increase the loss function J (−→y ,yCx ), pushing the prediction
−→y away from the predicted class Cx of the benign input. When
the loss function is large enough, the prediction will be changed
to some destination class other than Cx . (2) One can decrease the
value of yCx in prelogits (feature vector) or logits (prediction vec-
tor), until this value is no longer the largest among all classes, the
DNN prediction would misclassify the adversarial input. (3) By ex-
tending the loss function with a regularizer for the added noise,
the objective function is optimized by increasing the loss function
between the prediction vector of xadv and y
Cx , while minimizing
the impact of perturbation.
Similarly, there are three methods for targeted attack: (1) The ad-
versary may decrease the loss function J (−→y ,yT )with perturbation,
so that the crafting process is to perturb the input toward the target
class yT . (2) The adversary may increase the value of the prelogit
or prediction vector of yT until it becomes the largest one, so that
the DNN would misclassify the input into the target class. (3) The
adversary extends loss function with optimization and decreases
the loss function J (−→y ,yT ) while balancing the added noise.
Table 1 lists representative untargeted (U) and targeted (T) at-
tacks with respect to noise origin, distance norm, human percep-
tion (HP), and one-step or multi-step attack algorithm.
Attack type noise origin distance norm HP constrain iteration
FGSM U/T loss function L∞ θ one
Iterative Method U/T loss function L∞ θ multiple
Jacobian-based Attack U/T prelogit & prediction L0 max iteration multiple
CW [6] U/T optimization L0, L2, L∞ regularizer multiple
RP2 [10] U/T optimization L0, L2, L∞ regularizer multiple
Table 1: Example Adversarial Attacks and Algorithms
3 ONE-STEP ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
3.1 One-Step Attack Generation
We characterize one-step generation of adversarial examples on
their attack effectiveness and divergence using FGSM. All experi-
ments are conducted on MNIST dataset [21] with TensorFlow [22].
The adversarial update of FGSM is a special case of Equation 5 with
the crafting rule R( ) defined by function siдn( ):
xadv =x + θsiдn (
∂J (−→y ,yCx )
∂x
), untargeted
xadv =x − θsiдn (
∂J (−→y ,yT )
∂x
), targeted
In FGSM, θ serves as the DoC in L∞ distance and controls the
amount of injected noise. Note that DoC in L0 distance is different
across instances as the gradient of loss function is determined by
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the input instance and the DNN model. The objective function h( ),
which is the loss function, is to be optimized to achieve the attack
goal. The rule of perturbation noise injection depends on siдn( ),
which control the direction of the perturbation according to the
objective of the loss function based attack. For untargeted attack,
pixel values should be decreased if
∂ J (−→y ,yCx )
∂x <0, and pixel values
should be increased if
∂ J (−→y ,yCx )
∂x >0. Both are controlled by siдn( )
and aim at increasing (maximizing) the loss function between the
predicted vector and the predicted class label of the benign input
x , which causes misclassification on xadv .
By slightly changing the crafting rule, targeted FGSM attacks
can be established [19]. The difference is that the loss function for
targeted attack is defined between the prediction vector of a benign
input x and the target class of the attack. The direction of change
is to decrease (minimize) the loss function so that the prediction
moves towards the target class. We visualize the gradient of loss
function for targeted FGSM attack in Figure 4. It shows the pixel
position whose value is to be increased when
∂ J (−→y ,yCx )
∂x <0 (dark
area) and decreased when
∂ J (−→y ,yCx )
∂x >0 (light area). Compared to
untargeted attacks (recall Figure 2 and Figure 3), Figure 4 shows
that generating an adversarial example for successful targeted at-
tack is much harder. When the targeted classes are set to digit 0, 4,
5, 6, and 9 respectively, we vary θ from 0.1 to 0.4 with an interval
of 0.05, the attacks are unsuccessful no matter how θ is set. When
the targeted classes are set to digit 2, 3, 7, and 8 respectively, the
attack succeeds at different noise level (θ). The easiest target class
with smallest noise level (θ = 0.1) is digit 8, followed by digit 7
(θ = 0.15), then digit 2 and digit 3 (θ = 0.3). Larger θ beyond 0.4
will cause clear violation of HCx , HCadv .
TakeawayRemarks.The effectiveness of one-step attack heav-
ily relies on θ , which is the only parameter the adversary could
fine-tune once the crafting rule R( ) is fixed. For untargeted attack,
larger θ leads to larger update, and thus may result in over-crafting
and violate the minimal amount of perturbation constraint. Also,
large perturbation noisemay dominate the original input, violating
the human imperceptibility constraint. For targeted attack, only
the correct amount of noise can lead to successful targeted mis-
classification. Over-crafting may cause the prediction go beyond
the decision boundary of the target class, thus fail the attack. On
the other hand, smaller θ leads to smaller perturbation, and higher
chances of constructing adversarial examples that are not suffi-
ciently perturbed to make attacks successful in one step.
As we have demonstrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3, θ is an im-
portant control parameter for the effectiveness of one step FGSM
attack. For the same input, larger θ tends to increase SR. However,
larger θ successful for attacking one input may not guarantee the
success of attacking another input of the same class. Our analy-
sis and characterization calibrate the effectiveness and divergence
of adversarial examples with three interesting findings: (1) Differ-
ent input images of the same class (e.g., digit 1) may have differ-
ent attack effectiveness even with the same level of noise (same
θ) under the same attack method. This reflects the inherent prob-
lem of using fixed crating rules for all instances. The robustness
against adversarial perturbation is different across input instances.
(2) For any benign input, there are more than one way to gener-
ate successful adversarial examples (e.g., using different θ values)
using the same attack method. (3) Different levels of noise (vary-
ing θ) may lead to different attack effectiveness for the same input
since the attack is not successful when θ = 0.05. Also, two differ-
ent but successful attacks to the same benign input may lead to
inconsistent misclassification results (recall Figure 2, Cx = 1 →
Cxadv = 7(θ = 0.1) v.s. Cx = 1 → Cxadv = 8(θ = 0.2)). Moreover,
different images from the same class can be misclassified into dif-
ferent destination classes (shown in Table 2). It is critical to study
such non-deterministic nature of adversarial examples for defense
mechanism design.
3.2 Characterization of One-step Attack
We have shown that it is hard to balance between the amount of
noise added and the change of loss function value in one step at-
tack. In this section, we further characterize the effectiveness and
divergence of one-step adversarial examples by introducing a bi-
nary classification in terms of easy and hard attack categories for
all successful attacks. This allows us to gain deeper understanding
of bothθ and the crafting ruleR( )with respect to SR, DoC, entropy,
and the fraction of misclassified adversarial examples.
We observe that the hardness for changing the predicted class
of an input into another destination class varies for different desti-
nation classes under untargeted or targeted attacks. We can dis-
tinguish successful attacks with higher SR as easy and efficient
attacks and successful attacks with lower SR are hard and ineffi-
cient ones. Table 2 shows a statistical characterization of easy and
hard cases in one-step attacks with θ = 0.2. The diagonal shows
the percentage of adversarial examples that fail the attacks. We
consider two types of hardness in terms of different SRs: attack
hardness based on source (S) classes and destination (D) classes.
For the attack hardness on source classes, it is observed that the
SR of digit 1 is as high as 0.995, and the SR of digit 2 is as low as
0.771, indicating that 0.995 ∗ 1135 = 1129 images of digit 1 and
0.771 ∗ 1032 = 796 images of digit 2 succeed in source misclassi-
fication attack. We consider those attacks whose source SRs are
relatively higher as one kind of easy cases. However, within each
source class, different fractions of its N images are misclassified
into different destination classes, and such distribution is highly
skewed for some cases. For source class of digit 1, the highest frac-
tion that are misclassified into a particular destination class, i.e.,
digit 8, is 0.524 (1135 ∗ 0.524 = 595 images), and the rest of the des-
tination classes have significantly smaller fractions, ranging from
0.021 to 0.123. This indicates that the destination class of untar-
geted attacks is not uniformly random. We regard those successful
attacks whose destination classes have higher fractions as another
kind of easy cases.
We first study the hardness in terms of source class. Although
the per-class SR for each source class (e.g., digit 1) is different, Ta-
ble 2 shows that one-step attack is highly effective and all SRs are
relatively high with θ=0.2. To better understand the attack hard-
ness of source classes, we gradually lower the θ value from 0.2 to
0.1 and 0.05. Figure 5 shows the comparison of SR under different
θ . We highlight two observations. First, the SRs of all digits drop
sharply as we decrease the θ . Also when θ = 0.05, all source class
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Figure 4: Visualization of Loss Function-Based Noise Injection for targeted FGSM attack
S\D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SR # image
0 0.058 0.018 0.067 0.004 0.015 0.691 0.037 0.027 0.082 0.001 0.942 980
1 0.068 0.005 0.123 0.092 0.015 0.078 0.006 0.068 0.524 0.021 0.995 1135
2 0.010 0.001 0.229 0.052 0.049 0.341 0.018 0.065 0.208 0.027 0.771 1032
3 0.032 0.052 0.192 0.178 0.022 0.272 0 0.031 0.093 0.128 0.822 1010
4 0.004 0.017 0.110 0.063 0.048 0.045 0.014 0.049 0.571 0.079 0.952 982
5 0.047 0.006 0.142 0.100 0.074 0.135 0.029 0.016 0.341 0.110 0.865 892
6 0.056 0.070 0.217 0.013 0.116 0.156 0.041 0.004 0.307 0.02 0.959 958
7 0.031 0.030 0.314 0.047 0.018 0.018 0.001 0.117 0.385 0.039 0.883 1028
8 0.020 0.033 0.201 0.031 0.094 0.380 0.015 0.040 0.158 0.028 0.842 974
9 0.005 0.016 0.336 0.013 0.046 0.194 0.003 0.210 0.168 0.009 0.991 1009
Table 2:Untargeted FGSMAttack (θ=0.2): the cell at ith row and jth
column represents the fraction of adversarial inputs misclassifies
source class in ith row to destination class in jth column.
attacks become hard as all SRs are smaller than 0.35. Second, Dig-
its 1 and 9 have higher SRs consistently with all three settings of θ
compared to other digits. They are source class easy attacks under
FGSM. We view this type of hardness as the vulnerability of the
source class.
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Figure 5: SR of untargeted FGSM with Different θ : x-axis denotes
the 10 classes and y-axis denotes SR.
The average information entropy is another statistical indicator
to show the effectiveness of adversarial examples and the distribu-
tion of the prediction vectors. Table 3 shows the average entropy
of source classes under untargeted FGMS attack with different θ
values. Clearly, the more vulnerable a source class is, or the more
successful the sourcemisclassification attack is, the higher entropy
is, showing more even distribution of the probabilities in the pre-
diction vector(s). Note that without attack, the entropy is as low as
an order of 10−7. From both Figure 5 and Table 3, we can see that
the most vulnerable source class is digit 1, followed by digits 9, 6,
4, 0, whose SRs are above 0.9. The next set of digits with SR above
0.8 is 8, 7, 5, 3, with digit 2 having the lowest SR of 0.773, which
indicates that 234 inputs out of 1032 were failed under FGSM. We
observe that FGSM attacks with high SRs result in more evenly
distributed probabilities in prediction vector and larger entropy.We next examine the second type of attack h rdness with re-
spect to destination (D) classes. Table 4 lists the top three easy and
top three hard attacks. For source class digit 1, the top 3 easy des-
tination classes are target digits 8, 2, and 3 with fraction of 0.524,
0.123 and 0.092 misclassified into digit 8 (1135*0.524=595 images),
θ \ S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.05 1.46 1.96 0.54 1.47 1.3 1.06 1.24 0.93 2.17 2.26
0.1 2.72 2.82 1.37 2.64 2.54 2.16 2.3 2 3.02 3
0.2 2.97 3.27 2.44 3.06 3.12 2.89 2.96 2.83 3.11 3.12
Table 3: Entropy of FGSM under different θ
digit 2 (1135*0.123=139 images), and digit 3 (1135*0.092=104 im-
ages) respectively. This indicates that the fraction of misclassified
adversarial examples is a good indicator for characterization of the
effectiveness of attacks.
S Easy 1 Easy 2 Easy 3 Hard 1 Hard 2 Hard 3
0 5/0.691 8/0.082 2/0.067 9/0.001 3/0.004 4/0.015
1 8/0.524 2/0.123 3/0.092 6/0.006 4/0.015 9/0.021
2 5/0.341 8/0.208 3/0.052 1/0.001 0/0.01 6/0.016
3 5/0.272 2/0.192 9/0.128 6/0.0 4/0.025 7/0.031
4 8/0.571 2/0.11 9/0.079 0/0.004 6/0.014 1/0.017
5 8/0.341 2/0.142 3,9/0.11 1/0.006 7/0.016 6/0.029
6 8/0.307 2/0.217 5/0.156 7/0.004 3/0.013 0/0.055
7 8/0.385 2/0.314 3/0.047 6/0.001 4/0.018 5/0.018
8 5/0.38 2/0.201 4/0.094 6/0.015 9/0.028 0/0.033
9 2/0.336 7/0.21 5/0.194 6/0.003 0/0.005 3/0.013
Table 4: Top 3 Easy & Hard Attacks under untargeted FGSM: each
cell indicates the destination class digit and the fraction of adver-
sarial examples being misclassified into that destination class.
4 MULTI-STEP ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In one-step generation of adversarial example, θ indicates to what
extent an adversarial input is perturbed in one shot when the craft-
ing rule is fixed. However, determining a right θ is non-trivial.
Especially, smaller θ may lead to low SR or failure in one step
attack. One remedy of achieving high attack SR with small θ is
to use a multi-step boosting method. The iteration process termi-
nates when the misclassification goal is reached or when the per-
turbation violates HCx = HCadv . The multi-step approach could
increase SR significantly and make hard attacks at one-step eas-
ier. Table 5 shows the SR of multi-step iterative attack under un-
targeted FGMS with θ = 0.005, comparing the three settings of
iterations. Since the loss function is computed at each iteration to
fine-tune the attack direction, the noise injection is not simply re-
peating the previous iteration. With a few iterations, the attacker
can significantly enhance SR. Hard cases in one-step attack may
require more iterations to achieve certain SR goal comparable to
one-step easy cases with high SR. Thus, the number of iterations
can be a good indicator of the attack hardness.
iter \ S 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.172 0.325 0.026 0.063 0.184 0.089 0.213 0.11 0.137 0.261
3 0.796 0.921 0.751 0.789 0.897 0.793 0.903 0.843 0.775 0.960
5 0.988 0.997 0.924 0.959 0.971 0.935 0.982 0.976 0.937 0.998
Table 5: SR of Multi-step FGSM (θ = 0.005).
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For targeted FGSM attacks, however, multi-step attack is less ef-
fective. The experiment conducted to attack input images of digit
1 fails to reach the target digit 0 for all 1135 images in MNIST. This
is consistent with one-step targeted FGSM in Figure 4, where one-
step targeted attack is not successful even when θ reaches 0.4. Con-
sequently, boosting small θ iteratively may not improve SR of the
attack when the attack under large θ is not successful. In addition
to tuning θ , the crafting rule may also need to be refined iteratively
to boost attack SR.
4.1 Multi-Step Attack Generation
To better characterize the behavior of multi-step adversarial attack
on its adverse effect and divergence, we further analyze the gen-
eration and effectiveness of multi-step adversarial example using
targeted Jacobian-based attack [33], which possesses a prediction
vector-based objective function with two alternative crafting rules
based on single pixel or a pair of pixels.
Single-pixel crafting rule. Given input x and its prediction
vector −→y , the attacker first computes the Jacobian matrix JacF =
∂
−→y
∂x
= [
∂y j
∂x
]j∈1...m . Jacobian matrix on label j indicates the rela-
tion between input features (pixels for image data) and the predic-
tion on that label. That is, adding pixel value on one pixel would in-
crease the value of the predictionY j if the Jacobian matrix on class
j has a positive gradient on that pixel. Particularly,
∂yT
∂x
,yT ∈ −→y is
the Jacobian matrix for target class T . Since the prediction vector
of the legitimate input is generated from the DNN model, the gra-
dient value is determined by the training process and the model
is assumed to be differentiable. After computing the Jacobian ma-
trix for the entire prediction vector, the adversary can compute the
adversarial saliency map for target class S(x,T )[λ] for each pixel
λ.
S(x,T )[λ] =
{
0, i f
∂yT
∂x
[λ] < 0 or
∑
j,T
∂y j
∂x
[λ] > 0,
∂yT
∂x
[λ]|
∑
j,T
∂y j
∂x
[λ]|, otherwise,
,
(6)
This equation gives four concrete gradient based crafting rules: (1)
if adding pixel value does not move the prediction towards the
target class, i.e., the gradient of prelogit or prediction for target
class pT for the pixel is <0, or (2) the sum of all gradients other
than that of the target class pj (j , T ) for the pixel is >0, then the
value on adversarial saliency map on that pixel is set to 0. However,
if adding pixel value doesmove the prelogit and prediction towards
the target class, i.e., (3) the gradient of logit of the target class for
the pixel is >0, or (4) the sum of all gradients other than that of the
target class for the pixel is <0, then the value of adversarial saliency
map on that pixel is set to be the gradient product of (3) and (4). The
power of adversarial saliency map is that it optimizes the objective
function by considering both the gradient towards the target class
and the gradient of all other classes. Once the adversarial saliency
map is computed, the adversary could craft the image with the
pixels that have the largest adversarial saliency maps.
Pair-wise adversarial crafting rule. The above adversarial
saliency map considering individual pixels one at a time is too
strict, especially when very few pixels would meet the heuristic
search criteria in Equation 6. Papernot, et al [33] introduces the
pair-wise adversarial saliencymap. The heuristic searching for pairs
of pixels is a greedy strategy that modifies one pair at a time. The
incentive is the assumption that one pixel can compensate a mi-
nor flaw of the other pixel. For a pair of pixels (λp , λq), we first
compute its Jacobian matrices according to the prediction on each
label. Then pair-wisely, we compute A and B:
A =
∑
i∈{p,q}
∂yT
λi
, B =
∑
i∈{p,q}
∑
j,T
∂yj
λi
,
where A represents to what extent changing these two pixels will
change the prediction on the target class. B denotes the impact of
changing the two pixels on classes other than the target. Similar to
adversarial saliencymap, pixel pair with the largest value on−A×B
when A > 0 and B < 0 is chosen to be crafted. The perturbation
sets the pixel value to 255. A dynamic search domain is maintained
to keep track of those pixels whose values already reach 255. The
multi-step perturbation process iterates until the attack is success-
ful or reaches the pre-defined maximum level of noise tolerance,
such as 15% of pixels. For image of 28 × 28, the adversarial exam-
ple changes up to 28*28*0.15=118 pixels. If the adversarial input
reaches this maximum noise level but is still not predicted as the
target label, the attack fails.
Figure 6 visualizes the adversarial saliency map for targeted at-
tacks with each of the classes other than the source digit 1 as the
target in the first iteration. Moreover, the adversarial saliency map
of untargeted Jacbian-based attack is provided for reference. The
construction is straightforward according to the general principle
of perturbation injection. Since the value of adversarial saliency
map is widely ranged, it is hard to demonstrate its numerical dif-
ference. For better visualization, we set all pixels whose values are
non-zero in the saliency map towards the target class to 255. This
means pixels in light area are potential candidates for crafting. The
visualization shows clearly that the saliency map perturbation is
different across the attack target class, and the DoC values for suc-
cessful targeted attacks are different. Target attacks to digits 0 and
6 are failed with the 15% pixel-level perturbation threshold.
y∗ \ step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 788 490 329 268 228 171 160 119 94 -119 -148
4 -697 -430 -288 -156 -99 -66 -74 -58 -47 -2 -34
8 -507 -318 -339 -557 -617 -591 -564 -497 -443 -57 -11
Table 6: Prelogits trajectory of three representative classes (digits
1, 4, 8) over 10 iteration steps (source digit 1, target digit 8)
We use a successful 10-step Jacobian-based targeted attack from
source class 1 to target class 8 as an example to characterize the
multi-step Jacobian noise injection. Table 6 shows three represen-
tative classes over the 10-step targeted attack and Figure 7 shows
the prelogit trajectory for all classes in the 10-step attack. At each
step, an adversarial saliency map is computed and the pixel posi-
tion with largest value is chosen to be the crafting pixel. It is a
nested multi-step ensemble process with every step correcting the
perturbation trajectory path a little bit. Though the perturbation
is based on the gradient of prediction vector, the prediction vector
remains to be [0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0] for the first 8 steps, and changes
to [0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0] (predicted as digit 4) at the 9th step, and to
[0, 0, 0, 0.0067, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.9933, 0] at the 10th step, successfully
reaching the digit 8 goal of this targeted attack. It is observed that
the trajectory of prelogits is much smoother and more informative
compared to the drastic change in prediction vector in the iterative
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Figure 6: Visualization of Adversarial Saliency Map-based Noise Injection for targeted attacks. The Adversarial Saliency Map shown is from
the first iteration. The noise of digit 1 is for untargted attack.
-3000
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Number of Steps
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-150
-100
-50
0
9 10
Figure 7: Prelogits over 10 steps (source digit 1, target digit 8)
ensemble learning process. According to Figure 7, the perturbation
enhances the prediction of targeted class while the gap between
prelogits for different labels shrinks as the attack progresses step
by step to the 10th iteration. The prelogit of target class 8 gradually
becomes the largest, succeeding in misclassifying digit 1 to digit 8
at the 10th step.
Takeaway Remarks. (1) The pixel-level perturbation changes
the prelogits, the prediction vector, and the probability of every
single class in each step. This increases the hardness of targeted
attack when the number of classes is large, as it is more difficult to
choose the fraction of pixels as themaximum crafting cap, and very
likely 15% of pixel perturbationmay lead to low SR or failure of the
attack. (2) While softmax layer amplifies the numerical difference
in prelogits and normalizes them into the prediction vectors, per-
forming prediction vector based attack is equivalent to performing
attacks via prelogits. More interestingly, by noticing that the gap
of prelogits converges for several successive prediction attempts,
it may reveal the presence of a targeted attack. (3) The pixel with
larger adversarial saliency map indicates that adding its value will
move the prelogit or prediction toward the target class more. This
crafting rule, together with a limitation on the maximum iteration
ensures minimal amount of perturbation as well as human imper-
ceptibility. However, it also exposes some problems of this attack.
In addition to its computation inefficiency, the perturbation sim-
ply sets the chosen pixel values to 255 at each iteration, which
may over craft the input at times so that the noise deviates too
much from the amount needed and results in unsuccessful attacks.
Also adding full 255 to a pixel each time may not be effective or
human-imperceptible for colored images.
4.2 Effectiveness of Multi-step Attack
In this section we characterize the effectiveness and divergence of
multi-step targeted attack by analyzing the easy and hard cases.
Success Rate (SR).We first categorize the easy and hard cases
in multi-step targeted attacks using the high and low SR or the
large or small fraction of adversarial examples misclassified. Table
7 shows the results. For source class digit 1 with 1135 images and
attack target digits 0, 2, 6, and 8, the SR is 0.1%, 85.6%, 3%, and 97%
respectively. Clearly, the SRs for misclassifying digit 1 to target
digit 0 or 6 (hard cases), are much lower than the SRs for the target
digits 8 or 2 (easy cases). Also, the effectiveness of targeted attacks
is asymmetrical, i.e., the attack 7 → 9 is much harder with low
SR of 0.208 than the reverse attack 9 → 7 with high SR of 0.944.
In Table 7, the last column and the last row are average SR for
each source class and each target class respectively. Figure 8 shows
vulnerable and robust source classes, and Figure 9 shows hard and
easy target classes using the SR sum. Within each SR bar, different
colors indicate different contributions of each digit to build the SR
of the attack. It is easy to see that 1, 9, 6 are the top 3 vulnerable
source classes while 2, 8, 3 are the top 3 easy target classes.
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Figure 9: Hardness of Target
Degree of Change (DoC). DoC is another good discriminator
for easy and hard cases: the higher average DoC means that the
attack is harder. Table 8 shows the DoC for target attack on digit 1
and other classes being the target options. Digits 2 and 3 are easy
targets with high SR (Table 7) and relatively low DoC. It only takes
5% or 6.6% of change in pixels on average to misclassify an image
of digit 1 as digit 2 or digit 3 respectively. However, for hard attack
1 → 0, the DoC is 15% and the SR is 0.1%.
Average Entropy. We may also use average entropy to differ-
entiate easy and hard attacks. Two situations have low entropy:
benign input whose order of entropy is around 10−7, and unsuc-
cessful adversarial example. However, there is no linear correlation
between high SR and larger entropy for two reasons. (1) When in-
jecting full value of 255 to a pixel at a time, the per-step perturba-
tion may be too large, and such coarse-grained perturbation leads
to the change of prediction vector from one-hot source class to one-
hot target class directly, which will not increase entropy. (2) The
resemblance of source and target images (digits) may play a role.
For example, digits 5 and 6, digits 7 and 9 look alike, respectively.
And attacks 6 → 5 and 9 → 7 have higher SRs, and are more suc-
cessful. But their entropy values are smaller than attacks 6 → 3
and 9 → 8.Takeaway Remarks. (1) Designing a strong attack requires to
trade off between larger per-step perturbation and minimal degree
of change. An attack is considered strong if it succeeds with high
confidence or if the adversarial prediction vector is one-hot vec-
tor. However, not all successful attacks are accompanied with high
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S \ T 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 S: avg
0 0.027 0.970 0.039 0.205 0.147 0.049 0.307 0.352 0.170 0.252
1 0.001 0.856 0.838 0.415 0.502 0.030 0.686 0.970 0.510 0.534
2 0.001 0.006 0.285 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.136 0.237 0.004 0.076
3 0.001 0.027 0.483 0.005 0.136 0.003 0.125 0.114 0.110 0.112
4 0.000 0.188 0.633 0.155 0.145 0.013 0.768 0.386 0.173 0.273
5 0.013 0.246 0.077 0.592 0.033 0.037 0.217 0.478 0.105 0.120
6 0.040 0.176 0.815 0.223 0.618 0.382 0.183 0.630 0.116 0.354
7 0.003 0.034 0.636 0.562 0.027 0.129 0.000 0.320 0.208 0.213
8 0.003 0.086 0.858 0.575 0.071 0.317 0.016 0.107 0.015 0.228
9 0.010 0.084 0.613 0.761 0.387 0.003 0.000 0.944 0.825 0.403
T: avg 0.008 0.097 0.660 0.448 0.196 0.196 0.017 0.386 0.479 0.157
Table 7: SR of adversarial examples in Jacobian-based attack.
Figure 10: Top 3 easy cases per target in Jacobian-based Attack
Target 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DoC 0.150 0.050 0.066 0.101 0.102 0.148 0.066 0.029 0.093
Entropy 0.026 0.069 0.068 0.03 0.064 0.017 0.05 0.067 0.048
Table 8: DoC and entropy of 1135 images of digit 1.
SR. Often the successful multi-step attacks may lower the confi-
dence (the probability) of prediction to a greater extent. Moreover,
targeted attack is hard to develop and pays higher cost to produce
successful adversarial examples. We measure the time for perform-
ing untargeted FGSM attack and the time for performing Jacobian
based targeted attack using Intel @ Core i5-2300 CPU. The for-
mer takes 0.53 second and the latter takes 3.7 seconds per instance,
which is 7 times on average for the same input. (2) Even with the
same attack algorithm, top three easy cases may vary notably with
respect to SR, DoC and entropy, so do the hard cases. Figure 10
shows the top 3 easy Jacobian based attacks. The number in the
bracket is the SR. For images of digit 5, the top 1 easy attack is
5 → 3 with SR of 59%, and the top 3 easy attack is 5 → 2 with
SR of only 25%, though the attack is successful with only 86 per-
turbed pixels. Also the crafted image of digit 5 still looks like digit
5 visually, but the perturbation noise is visible too. These empirical
evidences show some strong and complex connection between be-
nign input, adversarial input, loss function, and prediction vector,
which inspires us to investigate the effectiveness of adversarial ex-
amples from another set of factors related to adversarial learning
and DNN training in Section 6.
5 ATTACK EFFECT OF DNN FRAMEWORKS
In this section, we characterize the effect of different settings of hy-
perparameters and different DNN frameworks on the attack effec-
tiveness of adversarial examples. We choose the number of train-
ing epochs to study the impact of overfitting, various sizes of fea-
turemaps to compare the effectiveness under different DNN capac-
ity and different DNN frameworks to evaluate their impact on the
effectiveness of adversarial attacks.
5.1 Different Number of Training Epochs
The first set of experiments reports the presence of inconsistent
easy and hard attacks under different training epochs.
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Figure 11: Impact of training epochs: higher SR, more vulnerable
and lower SR, harder attack.
We study easy and hard cases using Jacobian-based targeted
attack with a DNN model trained under three different settings
of epochs: 1 epoch (underfitting), 10 epochs (TensorFlow default)
and 30 epochs (overfitting). Figure 11 compares the vulnerability
of source class and the hardness of target class. The height of the
bar demonstrates the sum of SRs for each of the source classes (left
figure) or target classes (right figure). We highlight two interesting
observations: (1) Statistically, digit 1 is the most vulnerable source
class for all settings of epochs and digit 8 is the most easy attack
target for 1 epoch of training. For DNN with 30 epochs of training,
digits 1 and 6 are the most vulnerable source classes, and digits 2,
4, and 5 are the most easy targets. Both results indicate different
behavior of easy and hard attacks compared to 10-epoch results,
where digits 1 and 9 are the most vulnerable source classes, and
digits 2, 3, and 8 are the most easy targets. (2) The reason why
easy and hard attack cases vary under different training epochs is
due to the fact that different training accounts for different trained
network parameters, which describe the learned features. The dif-
ferent learned feature is reflected on the gradient of loss function
and prediction vectors, and subsequently impacts the effectiveness
of adversarial examples. Figure 12 visualizes the gradient of loss
function for DNN training under 1 epoch or 30 epochs for FGSM
attack and Figure 4 is for 10 epochs, where successful ones marked
by their θ value. These empirical evidence shows visible inconsis-
tency across different training epochs regarding success or failure
of attack, as well as regarding SR and DoC for successful attacks.
ƚƚĂĐŬůĂďĞůǇΎ ϬϭϮϯϰ ϱϲϳϴϵ
^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů;zͬEͿEz͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϬ z͕ ɽсϬ͘Ϯϱ E E E E E z͕ ɽсϬ͘ϮϬE
нɽ 灤 сǆĂĚǀ
WĞƌƚƵƌďĂƚŝŽŶŶŽŝƐĞȴǆ/ŶƉƵƚǆ
'ƌĂĚŝĞŶƚͲďĂƐĞĚ
ŶŽŝƐĞ
ĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂůŝŶƉƵƚǆĂĚǀ
&'^DĂƚϯϬĞƉŽĐŚ
^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů;zͬEͿEz͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϬ z͕ ɽсϬ͘Ϯϱ E E E E E z͕ ɽсϬ͘ϮϬE
'ƌĂĚŝĞŶƚͲďĂƐĞĚ
ŶŽŝƐĞĂƚϯϬĞƉŽĐŚƐ
ƚƚĂĐŬůĂďĞůǇΎ ϬϭϮϯϰ ϱϲϳϴϵ
^ƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů;zͬEͿEz͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϬ Ez͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϱ z͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϱEE E z͕ ɽсϬ͘ϭϬE
'ƌĂĚŝĞŶƚͲďĂƐĞĚ
ŶŽŝƐĞĂƚϭĞƉŽĐŚ
Figure 12: Loss Function-Based Noise at 1 and 30 epochs
5.2 Different Sizes of Feature Maps
We next study whether different sizes of feature maps have dif-
ferent impacts on the features learned by the DNN model, as the
change of learned features will be reflected by the gradients of loss
function and adversarial saliency maps, which will impact the be-
havior of easy and hard attacks. We reduce and double the original
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number of output features to generate feature map of half and dou-
ble sizes for the first fourDNN layers in TensorFlow. Figure 13 com-
pares three sizes of feature maps: half, original and double on the
vulnerability of source classes and the hardness of target classes.
For half feature map case, digit 1 is the most vulnerable source
class, whereas digits 2 and 3 are the easiest targets. For double fea-
ture map case, digit 1 and 9 are the most vulnerable source classes,
whereas digits 2 and 8 are the easiest targets. Again, the hard and
easy attacks vary for three sizes of feature maps with more easy
cases for normal size feature maps. Figure 14 visualizes the differ-
ent features learned under half and double feature maps using the
gradient of loss function under targeted FGSM attack, and visual-
ization for normal featuremapwas given in Figure 4. Similar incon-
sistency is observed across different sizes of feature maps, though
the impact of different training epochs on the degree of inconsis-
tency is much larger.
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Figure 13: Impact of varying sizes of featuremaps: higher SR,more
vulnerable and lower SR, harder attack.
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Figure 14: Loss function-based noise with different feature maps
5.3 Different DNN Frameworks
We next evaluate the impact of different DNN frameworks on the
effectiveness and divergence of adversarial examples. Figure 15 re-
ports the comparison results for TensorFlow, Caffe, Theano and
Torch. Clearly, TensorFlow and Theano are consistently more vul-
nerable under FGSM, followed byCaffe and Torch. Figure 17 visual-
izes the gradient of loss function based adversarial perturbation us-
ing DNNmodel trained by Caffe, Theano and Torch respectively. It
is clear that different frameworks lead to different features learned
by their DNN model, which contributes to their different influ-
ence on the effectiveness of adversarial attackswith respect to easy
and hard cases. Figure 17 also exposes some inherent problems in
FGSM attack method. The crafting rule in FGSM treats all pixels
equally, which may be inefficient since the gradients reflected in
the input data for each pixel are not the same. While the positive
and negative signs of the sign function are useful, assigning the
magnitude of sign function to 1 is not effective in many cases. For
example, in Torch, the identical perturbation noise smooths the nu-
merical difference of the gradient of the loss function on different
targets. Thus, the attack does not make full use of these gradients.
This may contribute to the low SR on untargeted FGSM attacks in
Torch.
Takeaway Remarks. First, adversarial attacks heavily rely on
the gradient of loss function and prediction vector produced by the
trained DNN model, and such gradient is determined by the pa-
rameters in the DNN function learned during the training process.
Both the hyperparameters, which influence on how the training
process will be conducted, and the learned parameters, which are
the fixed components of the trained model, will impact the com-
putation of gradient of loss function and prediction vector during
the generation of adversarial examples, regardless of specific at-
tack algorithms, and subsequently impact the effectiveness and di-
vergence of adversarial attacks. Second, for the adversarial exam-
ples crafted using the same attack method, easy and hard attacks
tend to vary under different hyperparameters and across differ-
ent DNN frameworks, indicating that the effectiveness of adversar-
ial attacks is inconsistent and unpredictable across different DNN
frameworks. Such inconsistency also presents under diverse set-
tings of hyperparameters used for DNN training within the same
DNN framework.
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Figure 15: SR of untargeted FGSM with different frameworks
Figure 16 shows the SR of untargeted FGSM attack on each
source class for only Caffe and Torch. Within each SR bar, differ-
ent colors indicate different contributions of destination classes to
building the attack SR. It is easy to see that the top 3 vulnerable
source classes in Caffe are very different from that in Torch.
6 ATTACK MITIGATION STRATEGIES
We have characterized the effectiveness of adversarial examples
in deep learning through general formulation, extensive empirical
evidences, and systematic study of successful attacks and their di-
vergence in terms of easy and hard cases. Motivated by the results
of this study, we propose some attack mitigation strategies from
two perspectives: prediction phase mitigation and model training
phase mitigation.
Prediction PhaseMitigation.Wehave shown that (1) success-
ful attacks (targeted or untargeted) often do not agree on the same
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Figure 16: SR of untargeted FGSM with Caffe and Torch.11
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Figure 17: Loss function-based noise with frameworks
noise level (θ) under the same crafting ruleR( ); (2) the sameθ value
that generates one successful adversarial example against a benign
input x of classCx may not work effectively for another benign in-
put of the same class; and (3) the destination class of untargeted
attacks is not uniformly random. Similarly, some target classes are
much harder to attack under the same attack scheme. These ob-
servations inspire us to propose two prediction phase mitigation
strategies: consensus based mitigation and time-out based mitiga-
tion, which are independent of trained DNN model and specific
DNN framework used for training.
Consensus based Mitigation. For each prediction query with
an input x , the prediction API from the DNN as a service provider
will generate q input queries x1, . . . ,xq such that the prediction
result is only accepted by a client when the majority reaches a
consensus. Given that all adversarial attacks do not respond to
the different input data of the same class consistently, such data-
diversity based consensus can be an economical and effective miti-
gation strategy. There are several ways to generate suchq query in-
puts. For images, one can leverage computer vision and computer
graphics techniques to generate alternatives views of the same im-
age. Also, the consensus protocol can be decentralized to make it
more resilient to single point of failure [17]. Each client may accept
a prediction result upon obtaining q consensus votes from the net-
work.
Time-out basedMitigation. For each type of prediction queries,
a time-out threshold is pre-set by the DNN as a service provider.
If such a query input x is compromised by an adversarial example
xadv for multi-step attacks, then the time for turning-around pre-
diction for xadv may exceed the normal histogram statistics for
this type of prediction task, and thus turn on an alarm. Such time-
out threshold can be learned over time or through training. This
mitigation strategy can be especially useful for hard attacks, which
requires longer iteration rounds to be successful.
Training PhaseMitigation.We have shown that the effective-
ness of adversarial attacks is inconsistent and unpredictable and
easy and hard attacks tend to vary under different hyperparame-
ters and across different DNN frameworks. Also adversarial attacks
heavily rely on the gradient of loss function and prediction vector
produced by the trained DNN model, and such gradient is deter-
mined by the parameters in the DNN function learned during the
training process. Thus, we propose three training phase mitigation
strategies as proactive countermeasures that can be exercised by
the DNN as a service provider.
Data based Ensemble Training. For each of the prediction
classes, an adversarial training in conjunction with data driven en-
semble is employed. This enables the training set to include suf-
ficient representations of training data for each class, including
those that can strengthen the resilience of prediction queries against
adversarial examples in the prediction phase. For instance, by study-
ing the hard cases and easy cases of each source class and each
target class, we can generate training examples that make the easy
attacks harder and make the harder attacks impossible to succeed.
Hyperparameter based ensemble training. By utilizing dif-
ferent settings of hyperparameters, such as different number of
epochs, we can train alternative models and use these diverse mod-
els as a collection of candidate models in the prediction phase.
There are several ways to implement the consensus for hyperpa-
rameter based ensemble. For instance, for each prediction query
with input x , a subset of hyperparameter-varied models will be
selected to produce prediction results and collect consensus ac-
cordingly. Round robin, random, weighted round robin, power of
two [38] or generalized power of choice [36] can be employed to
implement the selection algorithms.
DNN Framework based ensemble training. We propose to
deploy two types of DNN framework based ensemble training. The
first approach is to train a DNN ensemble model for prediction us-
ing a number of different deep learning frameworks (e.g., Tensor-
Flow, Caffee, Torch) or using different hyperparameters, such as
feature maps, within one framework such as TensorFlow. Recall
Section 5, we have shown that same adversarial examples have
inconsistent effects when using different sizes of feature maps, dif-
ferent DL frameworks from different DNN software providers due
to variations in neural network structures and parallel computa-
tion libraries used in their implementations [22]. In addition to the
ensemble of final trained DNN models, the second alternative ap-
proach for DNN framework based ensemble training is to allow
multiple DNN models trained over the same training dataset to co-
exist for serving the prediction queries.
Both approaches provide a number of advantages. First, differ-
ent models respond to the same adversarial example very differ-
ently in terms of easy and hard attacks as shown in Section 5,
thus the prediction API can detect inconsistency, spot the attack
attempts, and mitigate risks proactively. Second, one can also in-
tegrate the two alternative approaches for the DNN framework
based ensemble training, to further strength the attack resilience
through combining multi-framework or multi-configuration of hy-
perparameter based ensemble training with multi-view based pre-
diction ensemble. Such integrated approach can provide a larger
pool of alternative trained models for both training and prediction-
based consensus, which further strengthens the prediction query
based consensus.
Finally, we would like to note that our proposed DNN frame-
work ensemble approaches are different from the cross ML-models
based ensemble strategy, which provides ensemble learning model
by integrating different machine learningmodels, such as SVM,De-
cision Tree, with DNNs, in order to train a prediction model on the
same training dataset [31]. The recent study of the transferability
of adversarial attacks has shown that using the cross ML models
based ensemble learning may not be effective under transferability
of untargeted adversarial attacks [23, 31, 32, 43]. As pointed out
in [23], the transferability only works under untargeted adversar-
ial attacks, and targeted adversarial attacks do not transfer. There-
fore, our proposed two types of multi-framework based ensemble
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strategies can be viewed as a step forward towards developing a
unifying mitigation architecture for both targeted and untargeted
adversarial attacks.
7 RELATED WORK
Research on adversarial attacks in deep learning can be classified
into two broad categories: attack algorithms and defense propos-
als [3, 5, 11–13, 27, 28, 35, 37, 46]. Given vulnerability of DNN,
there have been quite a few attempts in building a robust system
against adversarial examples. Two classes of defense mechanisms
have been proposed. The first type of defense is to detect adver-
sarial examples so that malicious data can be removed before pre-
diction [5, 28]. [5] surveys ten recent proposals designed for adver-
sarial example detection. They show that all ten detectionmethods
can be defeated by constructing new loss functions, which makes
the adversarial example detection of little use. Besides, the defense
mechanism of simply distinguishing between clean and adversar-
ial data is not strong enough. It is better to also correctly classify
the carefully-injected adversarial examples. The second type of de-
fense is to increase robustness by modifying the DNN model, aim-
ing to increase the cost of crafting benign samples into misleading
ones [1, 3, 11–13, 35, 37, 45, 46]. Representative defense includes
adversarial training [11], autoencoder-based defense [13] and de-
fensive distillation [35]. While adversarial training is computation-
inefficient, the latter two mechanisms require some major modi-
fications on DNN architecture. Region-based defense [3] is a re-
cently proposed defense mechanism. It generates a number of sam-
ples around the input data and regards the label of majority of the
samples as the predicted label of the input.
For classification of adversarial attacks, [26] shows the impact
of network architecture on adversarial robustness, claiming that
networks with a larger capacity than needed for correctly classify-
ing natural examples could reliably withstand adversarial attacks.
However, larger capacity of the network will increase computa-
tion overhead significantly. [25] uses local intrinsic dimensionality
in layer-wise hidden representations of DNNs to study adversarial
subspaces, while [24] points out its limitation. In spite of a growing
number of proposed attacks and defenses, there is a lack of statis-
tical and principled characterization of adversarial attacks, which
is critical for systematic instrumentation of mitigation strategies
and defense methods.
8 CONCLUSION
We have taken a holistic approach to study the effectiveness and
divergence of adversarial examples and attacks in deep learning
systems. We show that by providing a general formulation and es-
tablishing basic principle for adversarial attack algorithm design,
we are able to define statistical measures and categorize successful
attacks into easy and hard cases. These developments enhance our
ability to analyze both convergence and divergence of adversarial
behavior with respect to easy and hard attacks, in terms of suc-
cess rate, degree of change, entropy and fraction of successful ad-
versarial attacks, as well as under different hyperparameters and
different DNN frameworks. By leveraging the fact that adversar-
ial attacks exhibit multi-level inconsistency and unpredictability,
regardless specific attack algorithms and adversarial perturbation
methods, we put forward both prediction phase mitigation strate-
gies and training phase mitigation strategies against present and
future adversarial attacks in deep learning.
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